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MADISONIAN DEMOCRACY AND ISSUE
ADVOCACY: AN ARGUMENT FOR
DEREGULATING PRIVATE FUNDING OF
POLITICAL PARTIES
Paul S. Edwards'
As we grapple with contemporary debates about how to regulate our
campaign finance system, we tend to view each reform proposal in isola-
tion. This brief essay examines how democratic theory about the prob-
lems associated with aggregating preferences spread across more than
two options, tempered with empirical observation and a few hard-nosed
assumptions, can instruct our thinking about discrete reform proposals.
An unintended consequence of regulating the financing of individual
campaigns is an increase in funding for advocacy of specific issues, a
trend that could destabilize democratic politics. The appropriate re-
sponse to this real concern is not to regulate issue advocacy, but to de-
regulate private funding of political parties.
I. MADISONIAN DEMOCRACY
Any discussion of campaign finance and democratic theory should be-
gin with an examination of the arguments of James Madison. Deference
to Madison's observations on this subject is not a simple appeal to origi-
nalist authority, but rather recognition that Madison was one of the best
students of democracy. Madison's vast experience as a practical demo-
cratic politician, coupled with his extensive study of the history and the-
ory of self-government, certifies him as a democratic scholar worth seri-
ous consideration.'
Madison argues that faction is corrosive to democracy,2 yet an inevita-
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1. See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON &
THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995).
2. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56-57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) ("The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils [by fac-
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ble result of liberty.3 "Faction" is roughly synonymous with the contem-
porary term "special interest."4 In Federalist No. 10, Madison suggested
that the great art of forming a liberal constitutional democracy required
the preservation of liberty of association and expression that gave rise to
special interests while frustrating the ability of such interests to threaten
security or property. According to Madison, the U. S. Constitution tends
to control special interests through several institutional means. First and
foremost, the role of geographical representation in an enlarged republic
plays a central role. This places the burden of mediating competing in-
terests on the individual representative of a district The second institu-
tional control on special interests includes the principle of majority rule
in a national (as compared with a regional) legislature.6 Again, the scope
of representation dilutes the power of any individual special interest. Fi-
nally, in Federalist No. 51, Madison recognized the tempering influence
of a divided government in which the various branches check each
other's individual power.
Madison claimed that the U.S. Constitution, which provides for repre-
sentative government over a vast territory as well as separated and
checked power, contains a mechanism that exhibits the "tendency to
break and control the violence of faction."' Two hundred years of expe-
rience with that constitutional framework, however, leaves many con-
temporary observers concerned that special interests are, in fact, gnawing
tion], have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every
where perished .... ").
3. See id. at 58 ("Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires.").
4. E.g., id. at 57 (commenting that a faction is understood to be "a number of citi-
zens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actu-
ated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citi-
zens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community").
5. See id. at 63. Madison suggested that:
[A]s each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the
large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
to practi[cje with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often car-
ried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
cent[er] on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and
established characters.
Id.
6. See id. at 64. Madison discussed the advantages of a national legislature:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in uni-
son with each other.
Id.
7. Id. at 56.
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away at the foundations of a just and liberal constitutional order, and
that the chief mechanism empowering special interests is our campaign
finance system.'
Madison's constitutional vision is usually a hard sell. It is based on
several pessimistic assumptions about human nature. Moreover, Madi-
son's view rests on a fundamental concern for liberty and property above
democracy. When Madison first propounded this perspective, it relied
on purely theoretical beliefs about untested institutions. Reformers con-
tinue to question Madison's assumptions and concerns whenever the in-
stitutions that he helped to design show signs of strain.
II. SPECIAL INTERESTS WILL PROTECT THEMSELVES AND SEEK
AVAILABLE RENTS
One only needs to brush up on the working of American politics to
recognize that money is, indeed, the lifeblood of American politics. This
is not to say, however, that the flow of money from special interests to
politicians is the prime motivator of legislative action. Instead, it is to
suggest that the legislative ability to redistribute the wealth of the nation,
offer economic rents to constituents, and alter basic property rights are
major motivators of political action.
To note that special interests will expend resources to influence the
political process is to speak positively, not normatively. There is a very
strong reform tradition that views any link between money and politics
as inherently tainted. However, such an aversion to money is largely an
aesthetic sensibility with only tenuous ties to egalitarian justifications.9
In order to advance analysis of what is at stake with regard to campaign
finance, we must begin with realistic assumptions of economic self-
interest.
Recognizing that special interests will expend resources to influence
politics and to protect themselves does not equate politics with economic
markets. As Douglass North notes, "formal political rules, like formal
economic rules, are designed to facilitate exchange but democracy in the
polity is not to be equated with competitive markets in the economy."1°
8. A fairly good representation of how this angst manifests in contemporary politics
is through the work of Common Cause. See, e.g., About Common Cause (visited Aug. 20,
2000) <http://www.commoncause.org/about/fact.htm>.
9. See George L. Priest, Buying Democracy: A New Look at Campaign Finance
"Reform," Address at the Eleventh Annual Bradley Lecture Series, American Enterprise
Institute (Mar. 6, 2000), available in <http://www.aei.org/bradley/b103060O.htm>.
10. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 51 (James Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990) (emphasis
20001
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Competitive economic markets permit individuals and firms to gain ad-
vantages through free and continuous exchange on the basis of secure
property rights. "Political competition, on the other hand, is the struggle
for authority, that is, the power to change exactly these property rights-
unilaterally, without any economic quid pro quo. Thus, in politics, prop-
erty rights are 'up for grabs,' not only economic rights but also ... the
rights to exercise public authority."" Moreover, electoral decisions are
structurally different from economic decisions. They are restricted by ar-
tificial geographic and temporal constraints, and result from the aggrega-
tion of votes rather than differentially expressed demand.'"
More importantly, the ability of politics to alter the baseline rules of
economic exchange dictates that political decisions will either spell disas-
ter or provide a windfall for various interests. In other words, interests
compete for control over the legitimated monopoly on violence in a
given territory. 3 In the same way that it would be irrational to leave
valuable objects unprotected in a high-crime area, it would be irrational
for any significant interest to ignore the processes by which the govern-
ment taxes or regulates. Interests attend to that concern in a variety of
ways, including contributions to individual political campaigns. Cam-
paign contributions, however, are only one way to protect one's interests
in the political world. An interest may choose to lobby, communicate di-
rectly with its constituents, or address specific issues.
14
In an economy where the federal government spends $1.8 trillion an-
nually, and where many of the processes of production are subject to
regulation that goes well beyond settled common law constraints on
force or fraud, it is neither irrational nor unreasonable for interests to
spend time and money to ensure that they are protected against appro-
priation. Many individuals will see opportunities in the system to pro-
cure legislation and regulation that give them, by fiat, what they could
not obtain through competitive market processes. Consequently, it is a
fundamental assumption of this essay that until the opportunity for ex-
added).
11. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 421 (Timur
Kuran, ed., 1998).
12. See generally Priest, supra note 9.
13. See MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 901 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1968) (applying the term "political community" to a group whose "social action
is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants a 'territory' and the
conduct of the persons within it, through readiness to resort to physical force, including
normally force of arms").
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspec-
tive, in 2 BUSINESS AND POLITICS 75 (2000).
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propriation or rents through legislation is eliminated, special interests
will expend resources to influence legislative outcomes and administra-
tive prerogatives. 5
The regulation of funds provided to individual candidates for their
election campaigns dramatically increases the transaction costs of solic-
iting and expending monetary resources in individual election campaigns.
In order to compete effectively for the time and attention of voters in in-
creasingly sophisticated and expensive media markets, candidates must
capitalize their campaigns through donations of $1,000 or less (per indi-
vidual) or $5,000 or less (per political action committee). These ceilings
have remained unadjusted since 1974 and, therefore, do not reflect infla-
tion. Consequently, capitalizing individual campaigns is an excruciat-
ingly time-consuming and demeaning exercise, which creates a very high
entry barrier to challengers. 6
It is not surprising that both the candidates and interests that labor un-
der this highly regulated, high-transaction-cost regime seek ways to
communicate their concerns through means and organizations that re-
duce transaction costs. One example includes the phenomenon of self-
funded candidates, such as financier Jon Corzine, this year's New Jersey
Democratic candidate for the Senate, who spent $36.7 million in his
party's primary contest. 7 Given the high transaction costs of raising
enough money for a media-savvy campaign from regulated individual
contributions, it is unsurprising that the constitutionally-protected use of
unrestricted expenditure of personal funds is an attractive model for
mounting efficacious political campaigns.
There are many creative efforts, however, made by the candidates and
the special interests to reduce the transaction costs associated with effec-
tively capitalizing campaigns. In California, where the Fair Political
Practices Act provides a highly regulated environment for candidate
campaign finance and lobbying on the state level,'8 individual state can-
didates attempt to link their identity with individual initiatives that are
unregulated by the Fair Political Practices Commission. Discrete inter-
ests also find that, at the state level, funding for individual initiatives pro-
15. See generally John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expen-
ditures Are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming Oct.
2000).
16. See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 61-62
(3d ed. 1992).
17. See Patrick McGeehan, Corzine Files to Sell $41 Million of His Goldman Sachs
Stock, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2000, at B5.
18. See Fair Political Practices Commission (visited Aug. 20, 2000) <http://www.fppc
.ca.gov/initial.htm>.
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vides a unique opportunity to pass their legislation into law without in-
curring the difficult coordination costs associated with ordinary legisla-
tion. '9 In addition, special interests have recently focused on issue advo-
cacy as a less-cumbersome way to share their message.20
In brief, positive analysis of campaign finance requires us to assume
that special interests will expend resources to influence policy. If these
interests do not do so through financing individual campaigns, they will
often spend money advocating specific issues.
III. REGULATION OF ISSUE ADVOCACY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
There were numerous attempts in recent years to regulate so-called
"issue advocacy," i.e., political expression that does not explicitly advo-
cate the election or defeat of an identifiable federal candidate. 2' The rea-
son that issue advocacy is now a separate legal category of speech stems
from the amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
(1974 FECA Amendments),22 and their subsequent interpretation.23
These amendments allow considerable regulation of so-called "express
advocacy," i.e. communications that, in express terms, advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of an identifiable federal candidate.24 The phenomenon of
issue advocacy, however, is worth examining because it is a less regulated
way for special interests to try to influence the political debate (as com-
pared to financing of individual candidates).
In construing the 1974 FECA Amendments, the Supreme Court
clearly stated that "[s]o long as persons and groups eschew expenditures
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identi-
19. See generally DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984).
20. See generally DAVID B. MAGLEBY, OUTSIDE MONEY: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE
ADVOCACY IN THE 1998 ELECTION (2000) [hereinafter MAGLEBY, OUTSIDE MONEY].
21. E.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997 (McCain-Feingold), S. 25, 105th
Cong. (1997) (broadening the definition of express advocacy); Campaign Independence
Restoration Act (Shays-Meehan), H.R. 1776 & 1777, 105th Cong. (1997); S.J. Res. 18,
105th Cong. §1 (1997) (proposing a Constitutional amendment allowing Congress to "set
reasonable limits on the amount of... expenditures that may be made by, in support of, or
in opposition to, a candidate for nomination for election to, or for election to, Federal of-
fice").
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
23. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
24. Although government cannot limit independent expenditures on express advo-
cacy, when an individual or group expressly advocates a federal candidate in coordination
with that candidate (or his agents), the expenditures on that advocacy are treated as con-
tributions to the candidate, and are subject to the FECA's campaign contribution limits.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Independent expenditures on express advocacy, however,
are subject to FECA disclosure and reporting requirements. See id. § 434(c).
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fied candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote
the candidate and his views., 25 The Supreme Court not only reaffirmed
this approach,26 but the federal courts have consistently invalidated the
Federal Election Commission's (FEC) efforts to expand its definition of
express advocacy in attempts to regulate issue advocacy, either throughefreetato27 oacul • 28
enforcement action or actual regulations. Regulation of so-called issue
advocacy is currently unconstitutional 9
IV. ISSUE ADVOCACY MAY RESULT IN UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS
Much of the debate about issue advocacy focuses on the concern that
there is no distinction between extolling or criticizing the policies of a
candidate and expressly advocating the candidate's election or defeat.
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
26. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (holding
that only express advocacy is subject to regulation).
27. See, e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); FEC v.
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FEC v. Central
Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm'n, 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980); FEC v. Colo-
rado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); FEC
v. National Org. of Women, 713 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1989); FEC v. Phillips Publ'g, 517 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1981); FEC v. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees, 471 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1979). But see, e.g., FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65
F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995); FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that a
noncandidate's campaign communication can amount to regulated "express advocacy" for
or against a candidate without using the specific words subject to such regulation by
Buckley v. Valeo).
28. See generally, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(invalidating 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(e)(2)); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991) (in-
validating 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(b)(5)); Maine Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8 (D.
Me. 1996), affd, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (invalidating 11 C.F.R. § 100.22); Clifton v. FEC,
927 F. Supp. 493 (D. Me. 1996) (invalidating 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (c)(4) & (5)); Minnesota
Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. FEC, 936 F. Supp. 633 (D. Minn. 1996) (invalidating
11 C.F.R. § 114.10).
29. See, e.g., Allison R. Hayward, When Does an Advertisement About Issues Become
an "Issues Ad"?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 63 (1999) (arguing that attempts to more broadly
regulate so-called "campaign" issue advocacy are inherently overbroad and vague). This
essay offers no conclusions about the numerous "truth in communications" laws being en-
acted by numerous state legislatures to criminalize misleading and erroneous claims in
campaigns and issue advocacy, except to note that such statutes appear to raise fundamen-
tal concerns under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and its progeny. See
generally Robert C. Post, Defaming Public Officials: On Doctrine and Legal History, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 539; see also generally Darrell M. West, How Issue Ads Have Re-
shaped American Politics, in CROWDED AIRWAVES: CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN
ELECTIONS 149 (James A. Thurber et al. eds., 2000) (describing these proliferating stat-
utes).
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Some observers conclude that since we regulate the latter, we should
regulate the former.0 This concern is understandable only if one accepts
the premise that we should regulate express advocacy (other than
through disclosure)." More importantly, a mounting body of legal
precedent suggests that no alternative could square with a concern for
the core value of free political speech enshrined in the First Amendment.
The increased use of issue advocacy raises a separate and prudential
concern. Creating a regime that funnels resources into issue advocacy
rather than into the mediating institutions of democratic politics, may
create a climate of unmediated democratic politics. Issue advocacy may
create unwelcome instability.
Madison's focused study of ancient and contemporaneous efforts at
self-government left him with one basic concern about democracy: its in-
herent instability.32 Madison's intuition that poorly structured democracy
is subject to violent instability is more formally captured in contemporary
positive political theory. One can find elegant attempts to justify majori-
tarianism from certain welfare criteria," yet we cannot escape the fact
that when faced with more than two options, democratic decisionmaking
is subject to the destabilizing effects of cycling and the opportunistic ma-
nipulation of agenda-setters.34 Although democratic theorists wish to
30. See, e.g., West, supra note 29, at 156-160.
31. See Paul S. Edwards & Nelson W. Polsby, Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of
Political Processes-In Praise of Multiple Criteria, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 190, 195-197
(1991) (discussing the problems of regulating campaign finance, and suggesting that de-
regulation with disclosure would be a better approach than trying to regulate along a sin-
gle measurable dimension).
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2, at 56-57. Madison wrote:
The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for
their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to [the vio-
lence of faction] .... Complaints are every where heard ... that our govern-
ments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an inter-
ested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to
deny that they are in some degree true.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Condi-
tions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).
34. A vast amount of literature now exists regarding these subjects. The basic idea,
however, is fairly intuitive. If preferences settle around three alternatives, A, B and C,
and there are three fairly well defined preference sets-one that prefers A to B to C, an-
other ordered B, C, A, and yet another ordered C, A, and B-then it becomes possible to
come up with an alternative that satisfies a majority. The voting scheme used, the order in
which the alternatives are considered, etc., will determine the outcome. See, e.g., PETER
C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 53-96
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minimize the real-world implications of these theoretic constructs,35 we
cannot ignore the fragmentation of political discourse and must ponder
what it might mean for democratic politics generally.
Madison hoped that the process of republican representation and de-
bate would serve to mediate among the intense special interests within
electoral districts. Ideally, each representative would internalize the dis-
sonance between competing interests in order to enhance chances for
election to office and his ability to function effectively within a collegiate
body. Politics may, however, begin to skirt representative and delibera-
tive structures, as discrete interests rationally divert their resources for
advocacy from individual candidates and into direct advocacy for their
concerns.
Snubbing the traditional legislative negotiations in order to implement
favored policies is not a new idea. Indeed, this was one of the core ideas
of Woodrow Wilson's late nineteenth century doctoral dissertation,
which strongly criticized the lethargic processes of congressional commit-
tees." Presidents, especially since the advent of mass communications,
understand that one way to overwhelm the traditional legislative process
is to mobilize broad public support through focused public relations ef-
forts and strategic use of the presidential "bully pulpit." Samuel Kernell
notes, however, that taking one's policy message directly to the public is
something of a one-shot, non-cooperative game for a President.37 "Going
public" is analogous to issue advocacy in that it tries to bypass a poten-
tially balky legislature by plebiscitary appeals to a mass audience. While
obviously useful to a President with a potentially popular agenda, such
appeals have the effect of destroying the social capital associated with the
difficult legislative negotiations.
Issue advocacy similarly attempts to bypass the costs associated with
building electoral and legislative coalitions, costs that are artificially in-
flated by regulation. In fact, although so-called issue advocacy is a ven-
erable practice, its use increased dramatically in recent years. In a path-
breaking study funded by the Pew Charitable Trust, political scientist
David Magleby documented a surge in issue advocacy in competitive
(1.986).
35. See, e.g., ROBERTA. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 144-46 (1989).
36. See Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (1885), reprinted in THE
LANAHAN READINGS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 93-97 (Ann G. Serrow & Everett C.
Ladd eds., 1997).
37. Kernell resists such formalization, contending that "[g]oing public may allow a
popular president to soar, but even as he does so he creates the risk of eventual collapse."
SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
45 (1986).
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congressional elections in 1998.3' Analysts such as Darrell West appro-
priately ask what such a surge in expenditures may mean for representa-
tive democracy. Although one may question many of West's assump-
tions, his alarming account of the rise of issue advocacy suggests that this
dramatic disintermediation of politics is an unprecedented phenomenon.
If nothing else, issue advocacy may fragment and decontextualize is-
sues. As a multitude of issues are traipsed across public consciousness
without reference to the tradeoffs associated with the traditional legisla-
tive process, and without the cognitive cues that come from parties and
broad-based interest groups, 9 the dangerous realm of democratic politics
with multi-peaked preference beckons. In other words, the potential for
serious instability in democratic institutions exists when decisionmaking
is not institutionally stabilized among binary choices.
Although I cherish the idea of broad choice in economic markets,
where exchange is voluntary and continuous, the expansion of choice in
democratic processes, where choice is periodic, and the results of collec-
tive choice may lead to huge spillover effects. Given the stakes, the bet-
ter alternative is relative certainty rather than many choices coupled with
the potential for unclear, incoherent policies. Admittedly, the existence
of issue advocacy and issue mobilization does not, in and of themselves,
overwhelm legislative processes that are still required for ideas to be-
come law. If such tactics resonate with the public, then they will increase
the pressure on legislatures to expedite legislation due to raw public
pressure rather than deliberation. The proliferation of caucuses may be
an indication that such tactics are causing legislatures to fragment under
this pressure.' °
The concern for stability is a primary issue with the proliferation of
"causes." There are, however, many other prudential concerns that are
relevant to the debate. For example, in his discussion of party reforms,
Nelson Polsby discussed one of the possible problems of politics without
intermediating institutions such as parties. He suggested, among other
things, that "[w]e might expect an increase in the amplification of the in-
tensity of short-term trends of opinion," e.g., fads, difficult-to-implement
referenda, or manias such as McCarthyism, 4' and an increased use of ide-
38. See West, supra note 29, at 155; see generally MAGLEBY, OUTSIDE MONEY, supra
note 20.
39. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA
206-207 (1998).
40. See, e.g., KERNELL, supra note 37, at 28-32.
41. NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 147 (1983).
[Vol. 50:49
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42
ology or personal beliefs to make sense of complex events.
Polsby also notes that movement away from reliance on intermediating
institutions does not mean that elites disappear, but that elites with dif-
ferent skills (e.g., telegenics) become relatively more important.43 In-
deed, the technologically-savvy, candidate-centered campaign is very dif-
ferent than its party-centered predecessor. These changes that vaunt
discrete ideas and their messengers over mutuality, consideration, and
comity in intra-legislative workings seem to create an unmanageable ca-
cophony in American political discourse. 4
V. POLITICAL PARTIES HELP TO MEDIATE AND STABILIZE
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
In Federalist No. 10, Madison suggested that democracy could suppress
its tendency toward fragmentation and violence by apportioning individ-
ual representatives for a geographic district (charged with internalizing
the vagaries and disparities of the interests in her district) that work
within a broad legislature in which the majority rules. Madison correctly
diagnosed many of the concerns posed by democracy, and proposed that
the antidote lay in enlargement and refinement. Madison did not fore-
see, however, that the organization of Congress itself, with its powerful
committees and logrolling, would allow legislators to trade their individ-
ual influence on behalf of relational contracting with special interests. 5
If individual candidates do not mediate well among interests, where
can one look for the kind of intermediation that a stable democracy
would require? The answer lies in competitive political parties. This as-
sertion flies in the face of many venerable scholars of democracy. For
example, Moisei Ostrogorski 46 and Robert Michels47 contend that true
democracy requires the abandonment of party structures. However, ac-
cording to Michael Munger, Chair of the Duke University Political Sci-
42. See id. at 148-49.
43. See id.
44. See generally RODERICK P. HART, CAMPAIGN TALK: WHY ELECTIONS ARE
GOOD FOR US (2000).
45. See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest-Group Competition
and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political
Action Committees, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1163 (1998).
46. See generally MOISEI OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGANIZATION
OF POLITICAL PARTIES, VOLUME II: THE UNITED STATES (Seymour Martin Lipset ed.,
1964).
47. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden Paul & Cedar
Paul trans., 1962).
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ence Department, an emerging consensus among political scientists con-
tends that "democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties.
4
1
Political parties, of course, are the organizations designed to win elec-
toral office.4 9 As Giovanni Sartori forcefully argues, the working princi-
pal of democracy is the ability of one majority to replace another major-
ity."' This ability, so suggestive of the vitality of democracy, is part and
parcel of what political parties accomplish when they struggle for major-
ity status by reaching out to voters. Through this process, the party elite
effectively empowers citizens with the potential to control their govern-
ment. Nelson Polsby has expressed that:
Two parties, in the constitutional presence of reasonably fre-
quent elections, means that a possibility exists that those citi-
zens disagreeing with the government or its policies have the
lively option of aggregating themselves behind the banner of a
party capable of replacing the government. The mere existence
of this option, it is believed, changes the attitudes and behavior
of incumbents, who as a result take an interest in a greater vari-
ety of public opinions. These conditions presumably mean less
arbitrariness in government:'
In other words, the way to enlarge and refine public discourse and to
maintain relatively stable institutions and baseline conditions is through
a healthy and competitive two-party system.
In the process of vying for political majority, parties serve many useful
functions. Parties can serve as a useful cognitive marker or heuristic, be-
cause many individuals possess limited cognitive capacity to comprehend
the complex aspects of governance. 2 By organizing and coordinating in-
terests, political parties help individuals overcome social choice and col-
48. Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin., 106th Cong. (Apr. 5,
2000) (statement of Michael C. Munger, Chairman-Designate, Department of Political
Science, Duke University), available in <http://www.senate.gov/-rules/hearings/
4500munger.htm> (saying that "it is no exaggeration to say that there is an emerging con-
sensus among professional political scientists that party is the most fundamental of all
democratic institutions"); see also E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1
(1942).
49. See Joseph A. Schlesinger, The New American Political Party, 79 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1152, 1153 (1985).
50. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 24-25
(1987). It is important to note that if we take seriously the contention that democracy is
about competing potential majorities than a roughly competitive two-party system will be
more efficacious than a multiparty system.
51. Nelson W. Polsby, The American Party System, in THE NEW FEDERALIST
PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 38 (1997).
52. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 39.
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lective action problems associated with political decisionmaking 3 If po-
litical parties are to maintain their electoral base, they need to organize
legislation that resonates with that base, thereby providing some ration-
ality to the legislative process.
Despite the emerging consensus that healthy, competitive parties are
an essential, intermediating institution in modern democracies, Ameri-
can political parties are relatively weak. In fact, it was not long ago that
American political parties were declared all-but-dead 4  There is in-
creased party cohesiveness in Congress, and careful empirical studies of
issue stances suggest that candidates and elected officials remain atten-
tive to the party base that nominates and elects them, even though the
direct connection is attenuated by countervailing concerns for openness
and legitimacy.5 Although scholars urge us to free ourselves from the
idea that there was some halcyon day of effective party-governance, it is
clear that parties are still reactive to the candidates who claim to them-
selves the party moniker. Even though so-called soft-money (money that
parties can raise without limit for purposes other than express advocacy)
increased substantially in recent years, it appears that the primary exper-
tise and technology for mounting political campaigns continues to reside
with individual candidates and their professional consultants rather than
56with the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION: MORE SOFT MONEY Is GOOD FOR DEMOCRACY
In order for democratic politics to avoid the frustration and cost asso-
53. See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995).
54. See EVERETT CARLL LADD, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? THE
FRACTURING OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL PARTIES xvii (2d ed. 1982); POLSBY, supra note
41, at 3; see also generally Gary R. Orren, The Changing Styles of American Party Politics,
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE OF
GOVERNANCE (Joel L. Fleishman ed., 1982); MARTIN P. WATI'ENBURG, THE DECLINE
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952-1980 (1984).
55. See KELLY D. PATTERSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 127-28 (1996).
56. See POLSBY, supra note 41, at 73. Polsby characterizes this phenomenon by stat-
ing that:
[A] new group of political decision-makers has gained significant authority.
These are the fund-raisers by mail and by rock concert, media buyers, advertising
experts, public relations specialists, poll analysts, television spot producers, ac-
countants and lawyers who contract themselves out to become temporary-or in
the case of a successful candidate, perhaps longer than temporary-members of
the entourages of presidential aspirants. They work not for the party but directly
for candidates.
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ciated with cycling, it must be channeled through institutions that can
mediate between the many heterogeneous interests within our nation.
We must assume, especially in the wake of the New Deal constitutional
revolution, which gave government sweeping powers to regulate, tax, re-
distribute, and alter the baselines of property rights, that those heteroge-
neous interests will "pay attention" to government actions. Yet too
much attention from legislators to the cacophony of special interests
could lead to instability.
Madison intimated this idea, which contemporary formal theorists re-
gard as "proven." Before anyone experienced the actual workings of
Congress, Madison suggested that the stable intermediation would be
largely a function of representation. It is terribly na've, however, to con-
tinue to believe that individual officeholders, by themselves, judiciously
mediate among special interests. When we abandoned that na'vetd, we
began regulating contributions to individual campaigns. However, this
regulation dramatically increased the transaction costs of raising cam-
paign funds, at the same amount that direct campaign cost were rising.
The result is an increased incentive for interests to funnel resources into
issue advocacy.
There is now a significant call from certain political elites to regulate
issue advocacy funding because of concerns about how such advocacy
may create tacit quid pro quo. In addition, they seem to believe that is-
sue advocacy could distort some romantic notion of fair political com-
munication. Finally, they are disturbed by the aesthetically repugnant
surge in funding for issue advocacy. However, any effective regulation of
such advocacy would be unconstitutional.
Issue advocacy enjoys constitutional protection, but like many forms of
protected speech it is not necessarily desirable. Issue advocacy necessar-
ily focuses on narrow issues without the inherent context of tradeoffs
that legislators regularly face; therefore it has the potential to generate
politics that divide rather than unite. If the trend continues down the
path started in 1998, independent issue advocacy may destabilize our
representative and deliberative structures.
The best institutional device for ensuring that elected officials concern
themselves with as broad a public as imaginable is our two-party political
system. Political parties help to mediate and to stabilize democratic poli-
tics. Accordingly, we should encourage private money to flow freely to
political parties. Such a system would provide mediated, responsive, and
certain outcomes that would minimize concerns about individual corrup-
tion.
Before closing, I want to state clearly that I oppose most restrictions
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on financing the communicative aspects of politics. Nonetheless, the sys-
tem might have inadvertently reached a rather desirable place with re-
gard to campaign finance regulation. The failure to raise the cap on con-
tributions to candidates is whittling away on the candidate-centered
model. Furthermore, because "soft money" is such an obvious place to
funnel funds that might otherwise be earmarked for individual candi-
dates, we may be reenergizing our political parties. And if that is true,
we arrived just in time, because issue advocacy will continue to provide
the centrifugal force against effective party governance.
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